This article is for the reader who is facing difficult ethical deliberations of a personal nature. Aristotle explained the process of reaching ethical decisions as the process of deliberation. It could only have three possible action outcomes:
- exhortation;
- admonishment;
- rebuke.
The article covers books 6, 8, 9 and 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book VI
In this book, Aristotle now examines the right principle which prescribes the mean. As a preliminary argument, he proposes to consider the virtues of the character by remarking that the rational part of the soul may be divided into two parts. The first part facilitates contemplation of things of invariable first principle. The second part facilitates contemplation of things which are variable. The first is called the scientific faculty, and the second is called the calculative faculty, which is the same as the deliberative and is a separate part of the rational portion of the soul.
Aristotle defines scientific knowledge as when a person has a conviction arrived at by induction, where the underlying principles are known with certainty. He defines art as a rational quality concerned with making as opposed to doing, which is qualitatively rational. It is study of how to bring a thing into existence. He defines prudence by reference to a person’s ability to deliberate. Prudence is defined as a truth-attaining rational quality directed at action in respect of good and bad things. Prudence is an excellence of virtue of the part of the soul possessed of reason that forms opinions.
Wisdom is shown to be both scientific knowledge and intuitive intelligence regarding things of the most exalted kind, so that a person can be wise but not prudent. The issue is with concern for the affairs of men. In this way only those who deal with particular facts are taking part in politics, because their deliberations lead to the last act in the legislative process. However, prudence is limited to concern for the individual.
Deliberation gives rise to a double possibility of error, namely in general principle or in particular fact. Prudence deals with a perceived ultimate particular thing, unreachable by scientific knowledge, but only by an intuition of the intellect. Deliberative excellence is not any form of opinion, but rather, it is a form of correctness. To deliberate is to investigate and calculate something, and an opinion is a stage beyond investigation. It is an affirmation.
Judging what is equitable comprises correctly ascertaining what is truly equitable, which is the consideration of forgiveness. Thus, equitable actions are a common thread in good men, and lead to the action of judgment of matters of prudence. However, wisdom and prudence as the virtues of the two parts of the intellect are desirable in themselves, even without any resultant action. This is because wisdom produces happiness just as healthiness causes health, and, prudence ensures the rightness of the means adopted.
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book VIII
This book begins by classing friendship as a virtue. As such, only that which is lovable is loved, and being lovable derives from being good, pleasant or useful. These three may be condensed into the good and the pleasant. Each person loves what merely appears to be good for himself, and which is also reciprocated. Friendships based on utility or on pleasure are based on the accident of affording some benefit or pleasure, and are most easily dissolved. Friendship based on the good, between those like each other in virtue, is the perfect friendship. Good temper and sociability seem to be the main causes of friendship. Also, friendship and justice are co-extensive as between the same people, and justice is defined as that which is to the common advantage. Rules of conduct between friends are ultimately a matter of justice. A friendship based on utility is the most likely to give rise to complaints, because the one thinks he is getting less than his due from the other, and can never be satisfied.
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book IX
In friendships based on pleasure on one side and profit on the other side, a rupture occurs just as soon as the parties cease receiving the things which had originally settled the friendship. However, friendship based on character is lasting. Aristotle defines a friend as “(a) one who wishes, and promotes by action, the real or apparent good of another for that other’s sake; or, (b) one who wishes the existence and preservation of his friend for the friend’s sake.” He notes that existence is good in itself for the virtuous person, the thinking part being the real self, and who possess agreeable memories and is conscious of his own joys and sorrows. The feelings thereby promoted are the feelings of friendship. On the other hand, bad men prefer the society of others, rather than recall their own unpleasant past, because their souls contain civil war. If a man sought to outdo everyone in acting justly or displaying virtues, in this way securing moral nobility, people will not find fault with him, and he exercises the most dominant part of himself. In this way, a man is his own intellect and becomes his own acts. This is the mark of a good man, and since no person would prefer to enjoy his goodness alone, man requires friends. Thus, the supremely happy man desires to contemplate the good actions of friends.
If existence is desirable in itself as good and pleasant, and if a friend’s existence is almost as desirable, it follows that a friend is a desired thing, and bound to be had. Thus happiness implies the need for an appropriate number of friends. This number is the largest number with whom a man can constantly associate, and is in practice limited to one by the necessary warmth of the friendship.
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X
Aristotle suggests that in respect of emotions and action, words are less convincing than deeds. Thus, when theories appear to be at variance with facts, contempt arises and truth is used to discredit the theories. For example: pleasure is not the outcome of motion or process because it is already a whole. However, pleasure perfects an activity as a supervening cause, and in this way is not continuous. Pleasure perfects a person’s life, each specific pleasure perfecting its preferred kind of action.
Since happiness consists in virtuous activity, the highest virtue must imply an activity of the highest happiness. Thus, the activity of the intellect, called contemplation, constitutes perfect happiness with a component of pleasure. The wise man is more self-sufficient than the just man, the temperate man and the brave man, as he can contemplate by himself. This activity of contemplation is loved for its own sake. It constitutes full human happiness over a full span of life.
Further Reading on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
A practical example of deliberation, using the above concepts, is in the process of legislation. In parliamentary debate, the parliament is usually more cognizant of deeds than of words. In many instances, parliamentary rhetoric does not even treat spoken words as actions.
For a further practical context in which to practise the art of deliberation, readers will benefit from reading Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics – Books I, II and III and Pros and Cons of Stem Cell Research - Ethical Issues.
Source:
Aristotle - The Nicomachean Ethics.
Join the Conversation